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1 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURAL ANALYSES OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW: A NEW METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Colin B. Picker

Abstract--The effective development and operation of the law faces many obstacles.  
Among the more intractable yet hidden barriers to the law are legal cultural disconnects 
and discontinuities.  These occur when opposing legal cultural characteristics from 
different legal cultures are forced to interact as part of the implementation of the law 
across two different legal cultures.  That conflictual interaction can impede or block the 
success of that law.  While present in domestic legal systems, those conflicts are more 
likely and the conflicts may be deeper between the many different legal cultures involved 
in the international legal order.  Identification of such legal cultural disconnects and 
discontinuities is the first step towards developing strategies to ameliorate potential 
conflicts between opposing legal cultural characteristics.  That identification requires 
examination of the relevant legal systems with legal culture in mind—a legal cultural 
analysis.  But, that methodology is rarely employed.  To the extent we do see legal 
cultural analyses, they are applied almost exclusively in the domestic arena.  When it is 
applied across legal systems it becomes a part of comparative law methodology.  This 
merger of comparative law and legal cultural approaches is unusual, indeed almost 
unheard of in the international legal arena.  This article explores that methodology, to 
argue that it is possible and valuable.  

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International economic law (“IEL”) has come of age: it is almost seventy years since the 
birth of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the World Bank; the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) has now existed for almost two decades; and in recent years there 
have been thousands of bilateral investment treaties and hundreds of preferential trade 
agreements launched.  Furthermore, there are now countless books, articles, reports, 
institutions, and specialized degrees in the field to attest to IEL’s maturity.  Yet, like 
much of international law, IEL has traditionally been analysed through conventional 
research methodologies. Given the level of maturity of the field it is now time that it is 
examined more vigorously under innovative and alternative methodologies.   In the 
increasingly complex and novel arenas in which the field now finds itself, those non-
traditional methodological approaches could assist researchers in teasing out deeper 
levels of understandings of the field in order to help it to develop and serve its 
constituents.  As such, this article presents the case for the application to IEL of such a 
novel methodology—comparative legal cultural analysis.   
 
Among the more intractable and hidden barriers to IEL are legal cultural disconnects and 
discontinuities, obstacles that would be amenable to comparative legal cultural analyses.  
Legal cultural disconnects and discontinuities occur when opposing legal cultural 
characteristics from different legal cultures are forced to interact as part of the 
implementation of the law across two different legal cultures.  While present in domestic 
legal systems, those conflicts are more likely and the conflicts may be deeper between the 
many different legal cultures involved in the international legal order.  For example, legal 
cultural conflict is likely to arise in the interaction between traditional indigenous 
knowledge and the international intellectual property regimes.  That discord may surface 
from, among other issues, the potential disconnect between the individualism present 
within the legal culture of international intellectual property and the collectivism found 
within many indigenous legal cultures.
1
 Identification of the relevant legal cultural 
characteristics can then permit solutions to be devised, permitting a more successful 
interaction between the participants from the different legal cultures.    
 
Identification of such legal cultural disconnects and discontinuities is the first step 
towards developing strategies to ameliorate potential conflicts between opposing legal 
cultural characteristics.  That identification requires examination of the relevant 
competing legal systems with legal culture in mind—a comparative legal cultural 
analysis.  To the extent we do see legal cultural analyses, it is applied almost exclusively 
in the domestic arena.  When it is applied across legal systems it becomes a part of 
comparative law methodology.  But this merger of comparative law and legal cultural 
approaches is unusual, indeed almost unheard of in the IEL context.  Nonetheless, this 
article will build the case for its application outside the domestic legal order and 
specifically for its utility in examinations of IEL.   
 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Lorie Graham & Stephen McJohn, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property’, (2005) 19 Washington 
UJL & Policy 313-337. 
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Of course, any discussion of methodology takes place against the background that 
methodology in legal scholarship is both too little explored and an awkward area.
2
 Too 
often legal scholars simply “do” research without careful consideration of 
methodologies.
3
  Unlike the social sciences or many other intellectual fields, 
methodology is significantly missing as an explicit matter from much legal scholarship.  
It is often absent in the publications, frequently not receiving any mention at all, and it is 
seldom explicitly discussed by legal researchers.
4
  All too typically, legal researchers 
only confront legal research methodology when they do interdisciplinary work and the 
non-law participants press them for an explanation of the research methodology.  When 
law scholars apply for grants they may also be asked for an explanation of their proposed 
research methodology.
5
  Such requests are often viewed with dread by legal researchers 
who then struggle to explain their methodology in an acceptable manner. 
 
Comparative law, however, is one of the few areas of legal scholarship where 
methodology is regularly discussed and arguably constitutes a significant portion of the 
field.  Indeed, some have considered comparative law to be merely a methodology, 
though the more accepted and modern view is that in addition to providing powerful 
research methodologies it also constitutes a field with substantive content.
6
  But, as 
discussed below, comparative law methodologies are almost exclusively applied to 
domestic law systems and are infrequently applied to international or transnational legal 
systems or institutions, especially not to IEL fields. Furthermore, for the reasons 
discussed below, on those rare occasions when comparative law is applied to the 
international legal order, though still producing useful results, it is typically applied in a 
limited manner.
7
  Rarely is a complete or holistic comparative analysis performed.  
                                                 
2 While not the subject of this thesis, the reasons for the dearth of explicit methodological concern in legal research are 
not entirely understood, but thought to be connected to beliefs that: legal education typical fails to teach research 
methodology, beyond that required for the practice of law; law, in the common law world in particular, is less 
intellectually rigorous than other social science fields; the traditional sources of legal research (cases, statutes, etc) may 
not require complex methodological approaches; the supremacy of doctrinal research has stifled development of 
research methodological capability by researchers; and so on.  This issue is presently the subject of research by the 
author, see also note 4 below.  See also Section III. 
3 A recent UNSW Law Faculty research seminar, held 26 June 2012, focused on the question “Should legal scholars 
worry about research methodology?”.  The view that much legal research does not include consideration of research 
methdoology was one expressed by many of the academics present. 
4 Idibid. 
5 See, e.g., Australian Research Council Discovery – Instructions to Applicants for funding commencing in 2013, at 16, 
available at http://www.arc.gov.au/ncgp/dp/dp_instructions.htm (last accessed 11 January 2013). 
6 See generally, Mathias Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth 
Century’, (2002) 50 American J Comparative L 671-700  (hereinafter “Reimann (Comparative Law)”). 
7 Typically the few analyses that exist deal with quite specific issues, such as international criminal law, and in 
particular the International Criminal Court. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, ‘The Nuremberg Paradox’, (2010) 58 
American J Comparative L 151-204; Robert Christensen, ‘Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The 
Importance of Considering Discrepancies Between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the 
International Criminal Court’, (2002) 6 UCLA J. Intl L & Foreign Affairs 391-423; see also Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, 
‘The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule Of Law”’, (2003) 101 Michigan LR 2275-2340. Though, there 
are a few examples of the merger of comparative and international law.  See, e.g., Mark W. Janis, ‘Remark, 
Comparative Approaches to the Theory of International Law’, (1986) 80 ASIL Procedings 152-175; David Kennedy, 
‘New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance’, (1997) Utah LR 545-637; 
William E. Butler, ‘International Law and the Comparative Method’, in William E. Butler (ed.), International Law In 
Comparative Perspective (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn and Germantown, Maryland 1980) 25-40 .  The 
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Furthermore, a contextual comparative analysis, such as a comparative legal cultural 
analysis, is almost never undertaken. This article will refute the reasons and obstacles that 
stand in the way of comparative analyses of international law fields. 
 
The article will first lay out the primary relevant methodological approaches for both 
international economic law and comparative law.  The article will then present the 
proposed methodology, comparative legal cultural analysis, in the process necessarily 
first providing detailed consideration of the difficult concept of legal culture itself.  
Finally, the article will bring together these different methodological approaches as it 
argues for the employment of a comparative legal cultural analysis of international 
economic law.  Given the constraints of a journal article, this article cannot provide 
detailed application of the methodology.  However, it should be noted that direct 
application of the methodology has already been undertaken in a series of specific, but 
necessarily brief, case studies that have been very recently published or are shortly to 
appear in print.
8
  Because those case studies focus on the direct implementations of the 
methodology there is correspondingly significantly less discussion of the background and 
bases of the methodology as are provided in this article. 
 
 
II. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
 
International economic law as a field is relatively new.
9
  Indeed, it is so new that it at 
times still faces existential challenges.
10
   While the individual components, such as trade, 
investment and finance, have been the subject of research for a long time, it is only in the 
last few decades that there has been vigorous and sustained research into these areas as 
individual parts of a connected field, each with their own, yet related, internal orders and 
                                                                                                                                                 
fact that one can list the primary examples within a footnote supports the assertion that it is a little used and developed 
methodology. 
8  Colin B. Picker, ‘A Framework for Comparative Analyses of International Law and its Institutions: Using the 
Example of the World Trade Organization’, in Eleanor Cashin Ritaine , Seán Patrick Donlan & Martin Sychold  (eds.), 
Comparative Law And Hybrid Legal Systems (Publicationof Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, 2010) (hereinafter 
“Picker (WTO)”); Colin B. Picker, ‘Comparative Law Methodology & American Legal Culture: Obstacles And 
Opportunities’, (2011) 16 Roger Williams ULR 86-99  (hereinafter “Picker (RWU)”); Colin B. Picker, ‘WTO 
Governance: A Legal Cultural Critique’, in Kenji Hirashima (ed.), Governance In Contemporary Japan (Publication of 
University of Tokyo Institute Social Science,  2011) 103-124,; Colin B. Picker, ‘International Trade and Development 
Law: A Legal Cultural Critique’, (2011) 4(2) Law & Development Review  43-71; Colin B. Picker, ‘China, Global 
Governance & Legal Culture’, in Junji Nakagaw (ed.), China And Global Economic Governance: Ideas And Concepts 
(ISS Research Series No.45, Tokyo: Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo., 2011)  (hereinafter “Picker 
(China)”); Colin B. Picker, ‘A Legal Cultural Analysis of Microtrade’, (2012) 5(1) Law & Development Review 101-
128; Colin B. Picker, ‘Anti-Poverty v. The International Economic Legal Order?  A Legal Cultural Critique’ in Krista 
Shefer (ed.), Poverty & The International Economic Law System (CUP, Cambridge 2013) (forthcoming); Colin B. 
Picker, ‘Chapter 6, Microtrade and Legal Cultural Considerations’ in Yong-Shik Lee  (ed.), Microtrade: A New System 
Of International Trade With Volunteerism Towards Poverty Elimination  (Routledge, 2013) (forthcoming). 
9 See generally Detlev F. Vagts, ‘International Economic Law and the American Journal of International Law’, (2006) 
100 AJIL 769-782(citations omitted). 
10 See Steve Charnovitz, ‘What is International Economic Law?’, (2011) 3 J Intl Economic L 3-22  (“I have not been 
able to find even two definitions that match.”). 
Colin B. Picker, Comparative Legal Cultural Analyses of International Economic Law: A New 






   Though, as such a new field, the exact contours and characteristics remain 
contentious and hidden, with very different views on what should be included within the 
field.  Detlev Vagts notes: 
 
‘[IEL’s] scope is controversial. According to one definition, it encompasses “the 
total range of norms (directly or indirectly based on treaties) of public 
international law with regard to transnational economic relations.”  A wide variety 
of international law rules have been said to have a financial impact somewhere. 
For practical purposes, . . . I define international economic law as the international 
law regulating transborder transactions in goods, services, currency, investment, 
and intellectual property. I exclude from the inquiry issues of private international 




This article does not need to engage in the debate about the definition of the field, though 
those parts of IEL covered in this article do in fact conform to Vagts’ definition of IEL. 
 
Like public international law, which is considered to have an insufficient understanding 
of its theoretical and methodological bases,
13
 there is little agreement or understanding 
and, until recently,
14
 little work on innovative and novel IEL research methodologies.  In 
part this is because IEL researchers would rather spend time discussing and presenting 
the results of their work, not how they researched those results.  Thus, aside from the 
recent attention given to empirical methodologies,
15
 it is hard to persuade IEL academics 
to organize or take part in workshops or conference panels on methodological 
approaches.
16
  Nonetheless, occasionally a conference or book will buck the trend and 
delve into IEL methodology.  One of the more accessible and holistic discussions on the 
subject are the works of Tomer Broude, Gregory Shaffer and Joel Trachtman presented at 
a conference that was organized with the explicit goal of seeking clarity on and 
understanding of the field of IEL as a whole.
17
  The products of that conference were then 
published in an edited collection.
18
 While other works exist, they are less precisely 
                                                 
11 Tomer Broude, ‘At the End of the Yellow Brick Road’, in Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas W Arner 
(eds.), International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline  (2008) 15-28, 15. 
12 Vagts （fn  9） 769. 
13 Joel P. Trachtman, ‘International Economic Law Research: A Taxonomy’ in Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & 
Douglas Arner (eds.), International Economic Law-The State and Future of the Discipline (Hart, Portland 2008) 43-52,  
45. 
14  See, e.g., Amalya Perry-Kessaris (ed.), Socio-legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, Context, 
Subtext , (Routledge, London December 2012). 
15 See, e.g., Susan Franck, ‘Empiricism & International Law’, (2008) 48 Virginia J Intl L 767-815. 
16 My experience as an organizer of numerous local, regional and global IEL conferences over the last decade has 
consistently found that formal discussion of methodology and teaching are typically eschewed by the vast bulk of 
researchers within the field. 
17 The American Society of International Law - IEL Group, Annual Conference: International Economic Law – The 
State and Future of the Discipline (9 November to 12November, 2006, held at the historic Mount Washington Resort at 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire—birthplace of the IMF and World Bank).  
18 Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas Arner (eds.),  International Economic Law - The State & Future of the 
Discipline (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008). 
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focused on the methodology of the entire field.
19
  As such, the work of Broude, Shaffer 
and Trachtman that appear in that edited volume will be the primary sources here for this 
article’s overview of IEL research methodologies. 
 
The “bedrock” of IEL research methodology is traditional doctrinal analysis.
20
  As 
Trachtman notes, this reflects the practice orientation of legal education, “because 
practicing lawyers need not often argue about what the law should be, but are more 
concerned with what the law is, theory and methodology are unimportant.”
21
  Though, to 
the extent theory is present, it is a form of liberal economic theory, but then that theory is 
itself  converted into “hard-nosed practical formulas” of the sort on which doctrinal 
analysis thrives.
22
  Broude, in discussing the continued relevance of this form of 
scholarship, even critiqued his own earlier work that employed that methodology as 
“ostrich-like, self centred, technical and legalistic”.   
 
Of course, other methodological research approaches do exist.  Shaffer has argued that 
some of the other approaches in IEL research include “normative advocacy”, “theoretical 
exposition” and empirical approaches.
23
  While empirical approaches are well understood 
and will not be further discussed or defined here, resort to Shaffer’s terminology on the 
other two less well known descriptions is helpful.  In normative advocacy  
 
‘[a]uthors writing in a normative vein typically advance a particular normative 
goal and then address how the institution, treaty or case law needs to be reformed, 
revised or interpreted to advance that normative goal. . . . The distinction of 
normative scholarship is that it explicitly aims to be transformative, while 
traditional legal formalist scholarship aims to be objective, purporting to describe 
law in neutral terms.’
24
    
 
In theoretical exposition  “the scholarship does not constitute theory in a positivist sense 
in which theory signifies the making of propositions (or axioms) that can be tested and 
refuted, but rather puts forward a positive or normative analytic framework for 
understanding law.”
25
   Shaffer’s terminology is not exhaustive, with others describing 
similar approaches under different terms.  Indeed, throughout legal methodological 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Issue 2, of (1994-95) 10 American J Intl l & Policy 595-992, comprising a series of articles from a 
conference on Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law. 
20 Gregory Shaffer, ‘A New Legal Realism: Method in International Economic Law Scholarship’  in Colin B. Picker, 
Isabella D. Bunn and Douglas Arner (eds.), International Economic Law-The State and Future of the Discipline  (Hart, 
Portland 2008) 29-42, 30; Broude (fn 11) 24. 
21 Trachtman (fn 13)  46. 
22 Broude (fn 11) at 19. 
23 Shaffer (fn20) 31-33. Trachtman would have defined the range of methodologies somewhat differently, though in the 
main does not depart too far from those discussed by Shaffer above.  The one exception, not relevant to the 
methodology at issue in this article, being Trachtman’s greater discussion of the methodologies associated with public 
chocie theory, including law and economics.  See Trachtman (fn13) 49. 
24 Shaffer (fn20) 31. 
25 ibid. 
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discussions one can find a proliferation of terms, with the taxonomy being confusing and 
suggestive of a plethora of approaches.  Yet they often overlap or duplicate with other 
supposedly different methodological approaches.
26
  Nonetheless, Shaffer’s terms are 
sufficient here, especially given their relevance to the methodology at issue in this article.  
Therefore, staying within his taxonomy, it can be said that doctrinal analysis remains the 
overarching approach for IEL, often supplemented by normative advocacy and 
qualitative or quantitative empirical research, yet with a theoretical framework likely 
included.   
 
Of direct relevance to this article, Shaffer then strongly argues for a “new legal realist” 
approach which he claims would provide important insights into IEL—it “builds from the 
socio-legal tradition of ‘law and society’ to engage in actual empirical work.”
27
  At times 
the exact content of that approach overlaps with the comparative legal cultural 
methodology discussed in this article.  But, unlike comparative legal cultural analysis it 
does not employ comparative methodological techniques and approaches. Nonetheless, 
Shaffer does notes the vital role of legal culture in creating the legal reality central to his 
methodology.  As an IEL scholar he even uses the World Trade Organization as an 
example for his proposal: 
 
‘[W]TO law does not exist in a separate, autonomous sphere—such as in the 
treaty texts or in the Appellate Body’s adopted decisions—but operates within 
particular legal cultures in which these texts and decisions play a part. These legal 
cultures include the interaction of the WTO judicial process with those who bring 
arguments to it, on the one hand, and the national institutions and “civil society” 




Shaffer’s proposal is not the same as that presented in this article. In significant part 
because it does not delve deeply into the inevitable legal cultural clashes and disconnects.  
Nor does it employ comparative law to the extent found in the comparative legal cultural 
analysis proffered in this article. His suggestion nonetheless provides support for the idea 
that methodologies along his approach and that discussed in this proposal are legitimate 
methodologies for research in IEL.  Indeed, Broude and others have argued for the 
employment of different and alternative approaches.
29
  Trachtman even argues that IEL 
researchers should go off in new directions specifically based on a better understanding 
of the many different and possible research methodologies: 
 
‘[w]e . . . should recognize where our collective knowledge of a particular 
problem is adequate.  One of the pathologies of IEL research, as of other law 
research, is to cover again ground that has already been covered.  Greater 
understanding of, and agreement on, research methodology will allow us to form 
                                                 
26 ibid 41. 
27 ibid 38. While I have not had the chance to read it yet, a new book edited by Amanda Perry-Kessaris looks to be on 
point. See Perry-Kessaris (fn 14). 
28 ibid at 40. 
29 Broude (fn 11) 25-26. 
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That includes consideration of methodologies employed by non-law disciplines, though, 
Broude in particular notes that we risk leaving the law behind when we delve into non-
law methodologies and are no longer “being jurists”.
31
  Thus, some efforts, such as those 
employing institutionalism,
32
 may be viewed as straying out of law and into sociology or 
other disciplines, though, of course, may still provide useful insights.  But, comparative 
legal methodologies, as employed in this article, are firmly within the law and permit us 
to stay solidly on safe ground, even as they answer the challenge posed by the failures or 
inadequacies of traditional methodologies.   
 
III. COMPARATIVE LAW RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
 
Given that the methodology proposed in this article is drawn from and employs 
comparative methodologies, this section lays out the relevant foundations of comparative 
methodology.  Furthermore, despite the lack of comparative law methodology in 
international law research, it is one of the central components in the intellectual inquiry 
into the law and as such will frequently be present even in methodologies that do not 
explicitly refer to it.  Indeed, comparative law has played a critical role in the 
development of the law from ancient to modern times.  Reputedly, Aristotle and Solon 
engaged in comparative consideration of other city-states’ laws as they developed their 
theories on constitutions and law.
33
   More recently, the drafting of the Australian 
constitution at the end of the nineteenth century benefited from comparative 
considerations of other constitutions, such as that of the United States.
34
  In addition to 
helping develop the law, comparative law also permits greater understanding of one’s 
own law, through reflection and understanding of other legal systems.
35
  But, the use of 
foreign systems as models or for self reflection cannot take place without 
methodologically appropriate examinations of those foreign legal systems.  Comparative 
law methodology is the decisive tool in those efforts. 
 
There is, of course, no “one” comparative law methodology. Indeed, there are numerous, 
sometimes contradictory, methodologies—from functionalism to the post modern 
                                                 
30 Trachtman  (fn 13) 43. 
31 Broude (fn 11) 26. 
32 See, e.g., Philip. M. Nichols, ‘Forgotten Linkages-Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and 
Analysis of the World Trade Organization’, (1998) 19(2) U Pennsylvania J Intl Economic L 461-511; Andrew T.F. 
Lang, ‘Some Sociological Perspectives on International Institutions and the Trading System’, in Colin B. Picker, 
Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas Arner (eds.),  International Economic Law - The State & Future of the Discipline (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2008) 73-88. 
33 John H. Merryman, David S. Clark, & John O. Haley, Comparative Law: Historical Development of the Civil Law 
Tradition in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia (Matthew Bender 1994) 1. 
34 See, e.g., William G Buss, ‘Andrew Inglis Clark's Draft Constitution, Article III of the Australian Constitution, and 
the Assist from Article III of the Constitution of the United States’, (2009) 33 Melbourne ULR 718-801. 
35 Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law’, (1998) 46 
American J Comparative L 43-92, 46. 
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contextualism to the post-post modern approaches.  These different methodologies have 
generated conflict and disagreement between the adherents of the different approaches.  
Despite the complexities suggested by those different approaches, comparative analyses 
are something humans perform numerous times a day, albeit usually subconsciously.
36
  
After all, when considering the differences between two people, we take into account the 
visible differences as well as their different abilities and characteristics—which in 
simplified form constitute the essential approaches of comparative analyses.  But, even 
though it is an innate ability, a more formal consideration and application of the process 
both deserves attention and will improve any comparative analyses,
37
 no matter how 
basic.   
 
One of the primary comparative law methods is “functionalism”—which argues that 
comparisons only make sense when what are being compared are functionally 
equivalent.
38
  In other words, that the legal issues compared are designed to address 
similar legal problems, regardless of differing names or other external characteristics.
39
  
For example, the concept of third party participation in WTO litigation, through its use of 
the phrase “third party” may incorrectly suggest the rights, liabilities and procedures that 
exist with respect to third party defendants or complainants in domestic litigations.
40
  In 
some respects, functionalism addresses one of the more common comparative analytic 
errors, which is to compare things that appear similar but actually have different 
functions within the legal system.  
 
It is especially difficult when working across legal systems that require linguistic and 
cultural translation as well as legal translation to ensure that comparable legal issues and 
problems are in fact being compared.
41
  Of course, aside from linguistic difficulties it can 
be hard to know truly whether things are similar or different, for the divergence between 
the comparables may only appear when each is combined or employed with another legal 
device.  In other words, the function may only be understood in the context of the 
complete legal system or field within which it operates.  Functionalism thus forms the 
backdrop against which comparative legal cultural analysis takes place.  Thus, for 
example, in a comparative legal cultural analysis of governance at the WTO, an implicit 
                                                 
36 The above discussion on comparative law methodologies in general is drawn from Colin B. Picker, ‘Comparative 
Civil Procedure: Opportunities and Pitfalls’, in Michael Legg (ed.), The Future of Dispute Resolution (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Australia 2012) 247-256. 
37 Other non-functionalism errors and pitfalls that may ensue from comparative analyses are discussed in Colin B. 
Picker, Article 2, ‘An Introduction to Comparative Analyses of International Organizations’, in Lukas Heckendorn & 
Colin Picker (eds.), Comparative Law and International Organizations: Cooperation, Competition And Connections  
(Publ. Of Swiss Institute of Comparative Law2013) (forthcoming) (hereinafter “Picker (IOs)”). 
38 See generally, Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functionalist Method of Comparative Law’, in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds.),  The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, Oxford 2006) 339.  
39 W. J. Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’, (1974) 23 ICLQ 485-519, 517. 
40 See, e.g., Xiaoming Pan, ‘Developing Countries Participating As Third Parties in the WTO Dispute Settlement’ 
(paper on file with author, presented at the Second Asia IEL Network Conference July 2011, University of Hong Kong 
Law Faculty) (suprisingly, the issue of third party rights in the WTO has received scant attention from scholars). 
41 See Curran (fn 35) 50 (1998); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, ‘Categories and Culture: on the “Rectification of Names” 
in Comparative Law’, (1996) 82 Cornell LR 19-42. 
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functionalist analysis will take place permitting the discussion of “governance” to take 
place across different legal systems—from domestic to that of the WTO.   
 
Common errors in functional analyses occur when there is a failure to understand: 
 




That the function no longer continues to exist
43
;  
That the function is not as anticipated or has changed
44
; 




That there may be many different functions
46
.   
 
In other words, functionalism can too easily be ethnocentric, viewing foreign legal issues 
through parochial lens.  This is manifested in the basic expectation that functions can be 
similar and that problems in different legal systems are the same, felt the same, or 
understood the same way.
47
  In a comparative legal cultural analysis one would expect 
that the enhanced sensitivities should preclude such errors, but noting the common 
pitfalls can ensure the functional analysis is not inherently flawed. 
 
Of course, there is no question that functionalism and the other comparative law 
methodologies engage in simplifications a great deal of the time.  But, that is the norm in 
comparative law.
48
  Nonetheless, comparative law methodologies can be quite 
sophisticated and like all fields, comparative law and its methodologies continue to 
develop in ever more sophisticated and complex ways.  The development of comparative 
law methodologies does not, of course, take place in a vacuum.  Changes within the 
larger world of the law away from doctrinal rules and towards legal realism contributed 
to the move within comparative law away from traditional approaches, even when they 
were not incompatible, towards consideration of such new approaches as legal culture.
 49
  
Accordingly, and developed in some measure in response to comparative law’s 
                                                 
42 See Oliver Brand, ‘Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies’, 
(2007) 32 Brooklyn J Intl L 405-466, 415.  
43 ibid 419-20. 
44 See Christopher A. Whytock, ‘Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law’, (2009) BYU LR 
1879-1906, 1890. 
45 See Brand (fn 42) 455. 
46 ibid 416. 
47 See Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke, ‘Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism’, (2000) 49 ICLQ 800-834, 820. 
48  See Reimann (Comparative Law) (fn 6) 677. (“First, it is understood today that all classifications are mere 
approximations to, not accurate reflections of, reality. We mostly continue to divide the world into civil law, common 
law, and several other systems but we know that these are ideal types which merely serve our need to maintain a rough 
overview.”) 
49 “Traditionally, the autonomy of the discipline of legal studies was located within the doctrinal rules, which were 
thought to be capable of generating solutions to every actual controversy.” Paul W. Kahn, ‘Freedom, Autonomy and 
the Cultural Study of the Law’, in Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon (eds.), Cultural Analysis, Clutural Studies and the 
Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism (Duke University Press, Durham and London 2003) 154-190, 155-56. 
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Contextualism is easily explained by considering that archetype of comparison—“apples 
and oranges”.  The differences between these fruits are vast, or so they appear in our 
ordinary life and use of those fruits.  One is green or red, the other is orange; one is citrus 
the other is sweet; one needs to be peeled, the other has edible skin; one can be baked 
into a pie, the other can be preserved as a marmalade; one grows in semi-tropical 
climates, the other in colder regions; and so on.  Those differences certainly suggest the 
two are not comparable—as is suggested by the traditional phrase.  But, both are fruits, 
both are healthy snacks, both cost roughly the same, both are easily available in stores, 
and from a scientific perspective, they are almost indistinguishable.
51
  In those senses, 
they are similar.  So, in addition to consideration of their function, their comparability 
depends on the context in which the comparison is being made—whether in the context 
of taste or cultivation.   
 
For IEL, the contexts that are, as an initial matter, critical for comparative consideration 
are the institutional, constitutional, historical, political, and sometimes sociological and 
legal cultural contexts. Thus, the context of IEL must include not only what is written 
down, but as it is applied and as it is informed by history and the institutions within 
which it operates.  Specifically, as argued in this article, IEL’s context must also include 
consideration of the relevant and competing legal cultures—those of the international 
field, the international institutions and organizations, and those of the different domestic 
legal systems and communities involved in the IEL.  Comparative legal cultural analyses 
are thus critical to understanding IEL’s context. 
 
IV. LEGAL CULTURE 
 
Before discussing comparative legal cultural analysis, the concept of legal culture itself 
must first be explored and explained—to the extent such an amorphous concept can be 
explained.   
 
The relationship between law and culture has been the subject of inquiry and discussion 
for centuries: 
 
 ‘[Nineteenth century] scholars such as Maine and Savigny attributed the 
brilliance of Roman law to the fact that, for whatever reason, Roman culture 
                                                 
50 Peters & Schwenke (fn 47) 827. 
51 See Scott A. Sanford, ‘Apples and Oranges--A Comparison’, 1 Annals of Improbable Research, May/June 1995, 
available at http:// www.improbable.com/airchives/paperair/volume1/v1i3/air-1-3-apples.html (last accessed 11 January 
2013) (scientifically “apples and oranges are very similar”); see also Catherine Valcke, ‘Comparative Law as 
Comparative Jurisprudence--The Comparability of Legal Systems’, (2004) 52 American J Comparative L 713-740, 720  
(noting the comparability of apples and oranges in the context of comparing legal systems). 
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glorified jurists who, for a long period of time, were dedicated to the aim of 




Similarly, legal culture is apparent in Montesquieu’s eighteenth century declaration in De 
l'Esprit des Lois where he claimed that law depended on “local conditions”.
53
  Also, as an 
expression of the role of legal culture, the highly influential nineteenth century German 
historical school: 
 
‘[C]onsidered law to be the manifestation of the people's national spirit 
("Volksgeist") and thereby particular to every nation--an organic product of 
society which has to be watched for and discovered, rather than made or tampered 
with.’
54
    
 
Nonetheless, despite its solid heritage, legal culture is an elusive concept.
55
  While the 
notions associated with legal culture are to some scholars vague and close to impossible 
to use, they are critical and imperative for others.  These differences, whether real or 
imagined,
56
 exist despite the fact that there are no shortages of definitions of legal culture.  
For example: 
 
‘[B]y “legal culture,” we mean the patterns of order that shape people, 









                                                 
52 Kevin E. Davis and Michael J. Trebilcock, ‘The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus 
Skeptics’, (2008) 56 American J Comparative L895-946. 
53 See Brand (fn 42) 430 (citing Montesquieu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 103-05 (David Wallace Carrithers trans., U. Cal. 
Press) (1977)). 
54 ibid 430. 
55 See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, ‘Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies and the Situation of Legal Studies’, in 
Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon (eds.), Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism 
(Duke University Press, Duhram and London 2003) 1-37, 12. 
56 Amy Cohen reports that Peter Fitzpatrick has argued that “that many definitional debates about culture split along the 
following lines: culture is claimed to be determinate, reified, and stable or foundationally indeterminate, dynamic, and 
riddled with fissures and internal dissent. Fitzpatrick, however, reasons that “‘[d]espite the seeming opposition between 
these [two dimensions], culture has to be in a sense both.’ He is moved to this conclusion by the myriad ways in which 
people interact with their own and other ‘cultures,’ producing both consistency and change.” Amy J. Cohen, ‘Thinking 
with Culture in Law and Development’, (2009) 57 Buffalo LR 511-586, 543  (quoting from a paper in Cohen’s records, 
entitled Peter Fitzpatrick, Costs of Culture 1 (unpublished paper prepared for the Law and Society Annual Meeting, 
Humboldt University, Berlin (28 July 2007)) and also quoting from Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘The damned word”: Culture and 
its (In)compatibility with Law’, (2005) 1 LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN 2-13, 11. 
57 Bernhard Grossfeld and Edward J. Eberle, ‘Patterns of Order in Comparative Law: Discovering and Decoding 
Invisible Powers’, (2003) 38 Texas Intl LJ 291-316, 292. 
58 Erhard Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands Compared to Neighboring Germany’, (1998) 46 
American J Comparative L1-41, 40  (citing René David, in INTRODUCTION, II INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (1972)). 
Colin B. Picker, Comparative Legal Cultural Analyses of International Economic Law: A New 




‘[A]nthropologists . . . interpret legal culture as a local phenomenon, shaped by 
local knowledge and practice, through which symbols such as “law” or ‘court,” 
understandings of “rights” and “wrongs,” and concepts of “crime,” of “normal 
trouble” or of complaining and dispute take on particular, locally relevant 
meanings. In an interpretive account, legal culture not only differs in different 




Cultural studies of the law fulfil the “need to investigate the ways in which law is 




Legal culture “refers to ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and 




‘[B]y “legal culture” is meant those historically conditioned, deeply rooted 
attitudes about the nature of law and about the proper structure and operation of a 




‘[C]ulturalists essentially contend that legal rules are embedded in local 
dimensions of the law. Each legal culture is a unique, culturally contingent 
product, which is incommensurable and untranslatable except through a deep 




Much of the cultural studies of law movement has been an effort to shift the 
location at which we study law from the opinions of the appellate courts to the 
expressions of ordinary people carrying out the tasks of everyday life.
64
   
 





While not defined explicitly as legal culture, comparatist Ed Eberle describes what is 
otherwise legal culture: 
 
‘[N]ot all external law is written. A second, deeper part of law lies beneath the 
surface and is less visible. These are the underlying forces that operate within a 
society to help form and influence law and give it substance. We might call this 
                                                 
59 Barbara Yngvesson, ‘Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture’, (1989) 98 YALE LJ 1689-
1709, 1690(citation omitted) 
60 Kahn (fn 49)  162. 
61 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply’, in David Nelken (ed.), Comparative Legal 
Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1997) 33-40, 34. 
62 Merryman (fn 33) 51. 
63 Brand (fn 42) 428. 
64 Kahn (fn 49) 155. 
65 Robert M. Cover, ‘Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’, (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4-68, 11. 
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the "invisible" dimension of law. Not that this dimension is wholly unknown or 
unrecognizable, but more that this dimension of law is one we tend to assume, 
take for granted, or perceive just dimly. Or we might think of these invisible 
patterns as underlying crypto types-" the pattern to be revealed - or legal 
formants-" non-verbalized rule[s]" - or "implicit patterns."  Or we might think of 
this dimension as "substructural, often unarticulated, categorizations. . . ."  We 
might refer to this dimension of law as internal: forces that operate beneath the 




Clearly the concept of legal culture has a rich and long history in the literature, and yet 
may be thought to fall short in fully explaining the concept in a tangible and manageable 
fashion. 
 
In this article, as was employed in the related case study articles, a more simple and 
functional definition, grounded in comparative law, will be offered.  Namely that legal 
culture is defined: 
 
to consist of those characteristics present in a legal system, reflecting the common 
history, traditions, outlook and approach of that system. Those characteristics may 
be reflected in the actions or behaviours of the actors, organizations, and even of 
the substance of the system. Legal culture exists not because of regulation of 
substantive law, but as a result of the collective response and actions of those 
participants in the legal system. As a result, legal culture can vary dramatically 
from country to country, even when the countries share a common legal tradition. 
Critically, legal culture is also to be found within international organizations and 
fields—for they too are legal systems. Those different legal cultures are critical 
for understanding the legal systems, for different legal cultures tell different 
stories,
67




But, legal culture should also be differentiated from legal traditions and legal systems.  
Legal systems are “the composite of the legal organizations, rules, laws, regulations, and 
legal actors of specific political units--usually states or sub-state entities[- - and] have 
largely the same characteristics[,] the same rules and organizations.”
69
 Legal traditions, in 
contrast, are: 
 
‘[f]amilies of legal systems, sometimes . . . legal models or patterns . . [but] a 
legal tradition is not a synonym for the history or development of law in a given 
country[, r]ather, it is the aggregate of development of legal organizations (in the 
                                                 
66  Edward J. Eberle, ‘The Methodology of Comparative Law’, (2011) 16 ROGER WILLIAMS ULR 51-72, 63 (citations 
omitted). 
67 See Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Harvard University Press, Harvard 1987) at 8. 
68 See Picker (China) (fn 8) 72-73 (citations omitted). 
69 Colin B. Picker, ‘International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction’, (2008) 41 VANDERBILT J 
Transnational L 1093-1140, 1094  (hereinafter “Picker (International)”). 
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broadest sense of the term) in a number of countries sharing some fundamental 




Thus, one can see that while similar, and often confused and at times interchangeable in 
some comparative analyses, the critical issue that differentiates a comparative legal 
cultural analysis is that legal culture is more informal, subconscious, and typically tied to 
just one system’s legal actors. In contrast legal systems are more formal and their 
characteristics are consciously created and applied, while legal traditions normally 
typically describe broad groupings and more typically reflect formal sources of law.  
 
Perhaps most critically, in contrast to the concept of legal traditions, legal culture reflects 
the “living law” in one legal system or community, focusing on the behaviour of the 
participants.  Legal traditions may set the environmental factors for those participants, but 
how those participants behave within those legal settings is a matter of legal culture, not 
legal tradition, though legal tradition may play a role in shaping that legal culture.  
Indeed, as Erhard Blankenburg notes “[t]he comparison of Dutch and German legal 
institutions has shown that similarities of formal legal systems are bad predictors of how 
legal cultures actually work.”
71
 A similar example showing the lack of congruence 
between tradition and culture are the very different legal cultures in England and the 
United States—both members of the Common Law tradition. 
 
Thus, legal systems belong to overarching legal traditions, while legal cultures exist 
within, and sometimes across, legal systems, completely or partially within the 
overarching legal traditions. There are legal cultures associated with legal traditions, 
geographic regions, legal systems, legal fields, and even associated with communities, 
large and small. For example, we can talk about the legal culture of the Socialist legal 
tradition, of Western Europe, of the WTO, of international investment law, of France, of 
family law, of the Amish community, or even of the Hell’s Angels.   The discussion of 
those legal cultures will be different, varying at each level, likely to be more generalized, 
diffuse and vague for the larger bodies or fields, yet likely to be very specific and detailed 
for the smaller focused communities or fields.  But, whatever the legal or geographic 
jurisdiction to which the legal culture applies, it will be the case that the legal culture 
resides in the conscious and subconscious behaviours and attitudes of the many different 
participants within that jurisdiction—from clients to lawyers, from judges to jurors, from 
citizens to politicians, from bike gang leader to family law professors. 
 
It should be noted, however, that complete legal cultures should be differentiated from 
the more specific legal cultural characteristics found within those legal cultures, and 
which comprise the data in most comparative legal cultural analyses.  It is the latter 
therefore, the legal cultural characteristics, which are typically at issue in those 
analyses—the heart of this article’s proposal.  After all, it is rare for an entire legal 
culture to be in opposition to another legal culture or to an international policy initiative. 
                                                 
70 Ugo Mattei, ‘The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship: Postmodernism and International Style in the Legal 
Architecture of Europe’, (2001) 75 Tulane LR 1053-1091.  (text at fn 68) (citations omitted). 
71 Blankenburg (fn 58) 39. 
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The relevant issues are thus the specific legal cultural characteristics within the larger 
legal culture. Legal cultures as a whole would typically be too large, amorphous and 
unwieldy to be very helpful when considered in the aggregate.  Nonetheless, there may 
sometimes be benefit to considering a legal culture in the aggregate, such as when 
considering the overall fit of one legal system with another.  Because legal cultures in the 
aggregate are not discussed in detail in the remainder of this article, a brief description of 
such an aggregate legal culture may be helpful (in addition, as the discussion below 
shows, the examination quickly devolves to consideration of specific legal cultural 
characteristics).  For that example, as it is the American legal system that is often 
portrayed as being the outlier in international law,
72
 this article will briefly discuss that 
aggregated legal culture as a concrete, albeit generalized example of a legal culture. 
 
Regardless of its utility or accuracy, we can speak of the legal culture that exists as a 
general matter across the entire United States—as an overlay under which the many legal 
subcultures are found and through which the American legal system operates.  But, that 
legal culture is really just an aggregation of the many different, sometimes contradictory, 
sometimes connected, legal cultural characteristics found throughout the United States 
(thus, once again, it is necessary to return to specific legal cultural characteristics).  The 
American legal culture may be said to include, among many others, the following legal 
cultural characteristics: individualism; pragmatism; parochialism; localism; nationalism; 
exceptionalism; messianism; legal minimalism; public participation; legal scepticism; 
legal realism; market force orientation; positivism; religious overtones; constitutional 
cultism; instrumentalism; utilitarianism; extreme adversarialism; and so on.
73
  The extent 
and depth of these legal cultural characteristics is, of course, debatable. While, many of 
them may be found in other legal cultures, it is the aggregate of these and other American 
legal cultural characteristics that comprises the American legal culture.   
 
Furthermore, in keeping with the definition of legal culture, those characteristics are not 
mandated by the formal parts of the American legal system or by the legacy of the 
common law tradition.  After all, statute, regulations, case law, or the overarching legal 
tradition are not the determinates of a legal culture, though they may reflect and influence 
the legal culture and hence may help to maintain that legal culture.  For example, in 
America the rules of discovery create the conditions for the abusive discovery that has 
become a part of the American legal cultural landscape, yet those rules do not mandate 
that sort of behaviour.
74
  The legal culture leads to those patterns of behaviour.  In other 
words, that American legal culture is not instilled through formal means—through 
regulation or other official means.  In significant respects, it is transmitted through 
American popular culture and through the American people’s collective observations of 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Colin B. Picker, ‘Reputational Fallacies in International Law: A Comparative Review of United States and 
Canadian Trade Actions’, (2004) 30 Brooklyn J Intl L 67-116. 
73 These observed legal cultural characteristics are based on my experiences in America as a law student, judicial clerk, 
attorney and as an academic, teaching American law (in America and overseas).  See also, Kimberlianne Podlas, 
‘Homerus Lex: Investigating American Legal Culture Through the Lens of the Simpsons’, (2007) 17 Seton Hall J 
Sports & Entertainment L 93-133  (humorous but very insightful examination of American legal culture). 
74 See, e.g., U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 et seq.; see especially Rule 26(b)(2)(C) (rules suggesting 
limits when abusive). 
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the way members of the public and the legal profession behave and respond to legal 
issues.  The professionals within the legal system are further exposed to the overarching 
legal culture during their legal education and subsequent legal practice.  Thus, American 
law students early on “pick up” that there is an expectation, not mandated by law, that as 
practitioners they will provide free, pro bono, legal service to worthy causes.
75
 Similarly, 
once in practice, new American lawyers find out that despite stringent state bar rules to 
the contrary, they can be expected as a de facto matter to practice the law of other state 
jurisdictions—to be “American” and not just local lawyers.
76
  Thus, legal culture while 
highly informal can be very powerful in creating the “living law” of a legal system. 
 
Though not the subject of this article, considerations of the American legal culture as a 
whole and its fit with the legal culture of international law or its subparts could be a 
fruitful line of inquiry.  But, that consideration will have to wait for another day.  This 
article is concerned with developing and explaining a methodology that deals with 
international legal cultural conflicts that may arise between legal cultural characteristics 
of different legal systems, including international legal systems such as that of IEL. 
 
 
V COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURAL ANALYSIS 
 
Comparative legal cultural analysis is the crux of this proposal.  Put simply, a legal 
cultural analysis of a legal system or community involves identifying those legal cultural 
characteristics which play a significant role in the development of that legal system or 
community, both internally and, in its comparative flavour, in its interactions with outside 
legal systems and/or communities. 
 
In considering the non-mandated behaviours of legal participants, comparative legal 
cultural analysis overlaps to some extent with some other realist legal analyses, including 
“socio-legal” analyses, such as that undertaken by Moshe Hirsch.
77
 There may also be 
some overlap with legal anthropology, especially when the legal cultural analysis is more 
descriptive.
78
  While the comparative legal cultural analysis suggested in this article is not 
ethnography, it is nonetheless akin to those analyses that seek a “thick description” of the 
relationship between culture and law.
79
   A “thick description” gives 
 
‘[a] complex account of the slippage between the production and reception of law 
and legal meanings, of the ways in which specific cultural practices or identities 
                                                 
75 See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, ‘Pro Bono Publico in a Parallel Universe: The Meaning of Pro Bono in Solo and Small 
Law Firms’, (2009) 37 Hofstra LR 699-734, 703. 
76 Arthur F. Greenbaum, ‘Multijurisdictional Practice and the Influence of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 -- 
An Interim Assessment’, (2010) 43 Akron LR 729-768. 
77 See, e.g., Moshe Hirsch, ‘The Sociology of International Economic Law’, (2008) 19 European J Intl L 277-299. 
78 See Naomi Mezey, ‘Law as Culture’, in Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon (eds.), Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, 
and the Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism (Duke University Press, Duhram and London 2003) 37-72,  58. 
79  See Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’, in Clifford Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays (1973) (Basic Books, New York 1973). 
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But, in this article legal culture it is not used just in a thick descriptive or thin interpretive 
manner, as is the case in cultural anthropology.
81
  The goal here is additionally the 
eventual application and utility of the underlying law related to the legal cultures at issue 
as well as examination of the real world interactions between legal systems and their 
participants. Thus, this article focuses not just on legal culture and its role in legal 
conflicts and disputes, but also on the relationship of legal culture with the other tangible 
work of the law, from transactions to the creation of international economic realities in 
trade, investment or other IEL fields. 
 
Furthermore, the comparative legal cultural analyses suggested in this article is not the 
same as these other methodologies for there will be a greater connection to comparative 
law within the analyses, which would not have been the case for these other 
methodologies.  A few comparative examples of legal culture and its relationship to 
different parts of the international economic legal order may help illustrate the point. 
 
For example, the manner in which disputes have been resolved between the members of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations very strongly reflects certain common legal 
cultural characteristics, such as “‘finessing’ and ‘defusing’” being “preferred to 
adversarialism and confrontation”.
82
  The reference to adversarialism can immediately tie 
into many concepts within comparative law,
83
 thus leading to numerous additional 
insights related to those legal cultural characteristics and legal systems and institutions. 
 
Similarly, the litigiousness of a state, a key legal cultural characteristic, has been found to 
be reflected in the state’s tendency to file cases at the WTO.
84
  Litigiousness has been 
examined extensively in comparative law
85
 and employing the lessons from those 
examinations can lead to insights relevant to that legal cultural characteristic and used to 
expand our understanding of that legal culture and the WTO. 
 
                                                 
80 See Mezey (fn 78) 54. 
81 ibid 56. Nor are Paul Kahn’s four methodological approaches applied here, for they concern other aspects of the 
cultural study of the law, more theoretical than utilitarian in the direct manner applied throughout this disertation.  See 
‘Article 3, Methodological Rules’ in Paul W. Khan, The Cultural Study of the Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship 
(the University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1999)  (hereinafter “Kahn (Book)”) 91-127. 
82 Lisa Toohey, ‘When ‘Failure’ Indicates Success: Understanding Trade Disputes Between ASEAN Members’ in Ross 
Buckley, Richard Weixing Hu & Douglas W. Arner (eds.), East Asian Economic Integration: Finance, Law and Trade 
(Edward Elgar Pub 2011) 150-182, 178. 
83 See, e.g., Picker (WTO) (fn 6). 
84 Ji Li, ‘"See You in Court!" to "See You in Geneva!": An Empirical Study of the Role of Social Norms in 
International Trade Dispute Resolution’, (2007) 32 Yale J Intl L 485-516  (while an excellent empirical analysis, this 
particular study would have been greatly improved through inclusion of comparative and specifically legal cultural 
analyses). 
85 See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, ‘The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Anti-Trust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers 
to Litigation in Japan’, (1985) 94 Yale LJ 604-645, 610. 
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Nonetheless, legal cultural analyses are difficult and awkward—hence their general 
absence from IEL research.  Indeed, despite the existence of numerous attempts to define 
and categorize legal culture, examples of which were provided earlier in this article, there 
remains a great deal of scepticism about the concept, even outside of the international and 
IEL context.  Roger Cotterrell, for example, notes that: “the imprecision of these 
formulations makes it hard to see what exactly the concept covers and what the 
relationship is between the various elements said to be included within its scope.”
86
  But, 
Cotterrell concedes that it is nonetheless useful “for its emphasis on the sheer complexity 
and diversity of the social matrix in which contemporary state legal systems exist.”
87
  Of 
course, legal culture analysis shares many of the same vagueness problems as exists with 
studies involving culture in general. As Oscar Chase notes: “The principal difficulties 
spring from the inherent vagueness of the concept, its potentially misleading message of 
immutability of practice and belief, and its failure to acknowledge individual departures 
from, and even opposition to, a social orthodoxy”.
88
  Chase then does acknowledge that 
“these problems do not trump the utility of the concept of culture as a short-hand way of 
acknowledging commonalities in practices, values, symbols and beliefs of groups of 




In addition, comparative legal cultural analyses may also be subject to many of the same 
criticisms frequently levelled at other contextual approaches within comparative 
methodology.    Those contentious could potentially chill the application of the 
methodology outside its usual arena.
90
  But, those disagreements are often not relevant 
outside the very academic arguments in which they are found and generally not relevant 
to the very real world practical applications of comparative legal cultural analyses.  As an 
initial matter, comparative legal cultural analyses must confront the post modern critique 
that true comparative law is not possible due to the fact that comparatists cannot escape 
their own legal culture in order to sufficiently “enter” that of another legal system.
91
 After 
all, “a valid examination of another legal culture requires immersion into the political, 
historical, economic and linguistic contexts that moulded the legal system, and in which 
the legal system operates.”
92
 But, whether impossible or not with respect to comparative 
analyses of domestic legal systems, the overall subject of the methodology proposed in 
this article is an international legal system—IEL.  Immersion into a field of international 
law is not generally contemplated by those comparatists arguing this issue and may not 
even be relevant to the discussion!  After all, international law fields occupy a space 
across all legal systems and are everywhere, including within the many different 
                                                 
86 Roger Cotterrell, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture’, in David Nelken (ed.), Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot, 
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87 ibid 29. 
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domestic legal systems.  They are fundamentally different to the geographically and 
politically bounded domestic systems typically considered by those seeking immersion 
into a foreign legal culture.  To the extent international legal fields and institutions 
include a legal culture, which this article does indeed suggest, then those legal cultures 
are not closed, but open to participants from all systems equally, with each contributing 
to the formation of the legal culture of the international institution or field.  As such, the 
outsider comparatist has the ability to immerse herself into the subject legal culture as 
easily as any of the many different participants from the numerous different domestic 
legal systems that participate in the institution or field.  True, there are factors, accessible 
to all with sufficient preparation, that will assist in that immersion.  They include 
language, educational and professional experiences, legal tradition background and so 
on—all factors that should be considered by a researcher when embarking on a 
comparative legal cultural analysis of an international field or institution.  Of course, 
when analysing the legal culture of any relevant domestic systems, legal cultural analysis 
does enter the terrain governed by the “inability to immerse” critique.  But, because the 
comparative legal cultural analysis is not intended to understand or analyse the complete 
domestic legal systems at issue, the issue of incomplete immersion is perhaps not as 
present, certainly not present to such a degree to rule out the analysis.  Furthermore, 
because multiple domestic legal systems may be relevant to the international legal system 
under examination, full immersion into all of them is perhaps an unattainable goal outside 
the context of a vast team of researchers all working together.  Hence, while the critique 
should be noted and taken into account as much as possible, it cannot stand as an obstacle 
if comparative legal cultural analyses are to be undertaken. 
 
Like comparative law methodologies in general, comparative legal cultural analysis must 
be able to respond to post-modernist critiques.  The proposed methodology does not fit 
well with the extreme positions found among some of the post-modernists, such as those 
associated with epistemic and moral relativism positions.
93
  Rather, this work may best fit 
with the post-post modernists within comparative law. 
 
‘[A] post-post-modernist approach to comparative law will retain the (self-
)critical impetus of the post-modernist critique, reject the postmodernist assertion 
that objectivity is not attainable in comparative law, and synthesise old and new 
demands for interdisciplinarity and thoughtful hermeneutics.’
94
   
 
Nonetheless, the methodology is generally not concerned with the validity or otherwise 
of one comparative methodology over another.  It can operate within the assumption that 
the traditional, modern and post-modern methodologies and bases of comparative law, 
especially that of functionalism, are important and insightful approaches.   
 
Similarly, the methodology proposed here does not need to be considered alongside or 
within the arguments concerning the impossibility of legal transplantation, a position well 
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94 ibid 829-32, 829. 
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argued by Pierre Legrande in numerous works.
95
  As an initial matter, the methodology is 
not primarily concerned with the transplantation of law from one domestic system to 
another.  Rather, here the concern is with the relationships between international law, 
international organizations and domestic legal systems—but only insofar as that domestic 
law is relevant to the international organization, the international law, or the domestically 
implemented international law.  Nonetheless, transplantation is relevant to some aspects 
of the article, but the fact that legal cultural analyses are involved serves to mitigate 
Legrande’s critique of the typical academic discussions of transplantation.  His essential 
argument is that transplantation efforts are inherently flawed, for imported law that is 
itself culturally anchored to a foreign system cannot be imported into a legal system that 
is itself also intrinsically linked to a necessarily different context.
96
  But, the very issues 
that Legrande raises, are the very issues examined here even as they may be absent in the 
typical works involving legal transplantation.  As such, there is no need for the article to 
confront Legrande’s critique, for that critique is already a part of the very fabric of the 
article. 
 
Comparative law can be difficult and rife with substantive, methodological and 
theoretical pitfalls.  For the most part, the debates about methodology within comparative 
law are simply not relevant to the methodology proposed in this article.  But, because of 
the definitional and vagueness issues, legal culture analyses can still be awkward and 
misunderstood,  and consequently ignored or minimized within the already contentious 
and difficult comparative law.  It is thus no surprise that comparative and legal cultural 
analyses are hardly applied outside the usual domestic legal system subjects that form the 
primary arena of comparative law.  As such, this article’s application of comparative and 
comparative legal cultural analyses to an international law field, IEL, pushes the bounds 
of those methodologies. 
 
VI. COMPARATIVE AND LEGAL CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
 
 
Trachtman rightly notes that “each research method has a domain in which it is 
illuminating.  Outside that domain, it may be misleading.”
97
  But, the domain of 
comparative law methodologies can, as this article seeks to show, be extended to include 
international fields.   Indeed, some scholars at the micro level have with some success 
employed aspects of comparative law to examine discreet areas of international law.
98
  
Though, for the most part, scholars either ignore or fail to use comparative methodologies 
                                                 
95 See, e.g., Pierre Legrande, ‘What “Legal Transplants”?’ in  David Nelken & Johannes Feest (eds.), Adapting Legal 
Cultures (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001) 55-70. 
96 ibid 60-65. 
97 Trachtman (fn 13) 44. 
98 See note 7 above.  
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to examine international law fields—especially at a macro level.
99
  But, it is possible—
and potentially fruitful.  For example, one of the background works to this article 
provided a unique comparative analysis of public international law as a whole.
100
 That
examination approached international law through the classic western comparative law 
taxonomy, identifying common and civil law characteristics that exist within 
international law.  It came to the conclusion that public international law is 
predominantly a mix of characteristics that derive from the civilian and common law 
traditions, and furthermore that the nature of the mix bears substantial similarity to those 
jurisdictions known as “mixed jurisdictions”.
101
  That conclusion suggests that the
ongoing development of public international law may benefit from consideration of how 
the similar mixed jurisdictions have successfully handled the mix of common and civil 
law components of their legal systems.  
Nonetheless, despite the utility of such works there is scepticism within the public 
international law field that comparative law drawn from the domestic arena is relevant to 
what is often considered to be the unique international law system.
102
  Even aside from
any notions of uniqueness, international law research tends to shy away from 
comparative law methodologies.
103
 An uncharitable explanation could be that it is due in
part to international law’s parochial and superior nature.
104
  Indeed, while referring to
domestic systems, and there is little to suggest it is not as applicable to international 
systems, Karl Llewellyn noted that:  
“[N]owhere more than in law do you need armor against . . . ethnocentric and 
chronocentric snobbery-the smugness of [one’s] own tribe and [one’s] own time: 
We are the Greeks, all others are barbarians.”
105
As such, international law research will too often see little value in domestic legal 
systems—despite the clear domestic law heritage of much of international law.
106
99 See Valentina Vadi, ‘Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, (2010) 
39 Denver J Intl L & Policy 67-100  (“ Comparativists and internationalists alike have almost entirely neglected the 
interaction between international law and comparative law.”). 
100 See Picker (International Law) (fn 69). 
101 Mixed jurisdictions were first defined more than one hundred years ago as “legal systems in which the 
Romano-Germanic tradition has become suffused to some degree by Anglo-American law.” William 
Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified)’, (2000) 60 Louisiana 
LR 677-738, 679  (citations omitted); see also Vernon Valentine Palmer (ed.), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: 
The Third Legal Family ( CUP, Cambridge 2001). 
102 See Aleksandar Momirov & Andria Naudé Fourie, ‘Vertical Comparative Law Methods: Tools for Conceptualising 
the International Rule of Law’, (2009) 2 Erasmus LR 291-310, 296. 
103 See Jaye Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’, (2011) 22 European J Intl L 949-971; but see Charles H. 
Koch, Jr., ‘Envisioning a Global Legal Culture’, (2003) 25 Michigan J Intl L 1-76  (though, the article is more focused 
on identifying some future collective global legal culture). 
104 See, e.g., ibid 4. Such attitudes are found in other large legal (and small) legal systems as well.  See also Picker 
(RWU), supra note 8. 
105 K. N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 42-43 (7th prtg. Ocena Publications, New York 1981). 
106 See Picker (International Law) (fn 69). 
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If there has been little use of comparative law methodologies within general international 
law research it should not then be surprising that the relatively more hard-nosed 
economics-based field of IEL also typically fails to utilize comparative law 
methodologies.
107
  Also, comparative legal cultural analyses, the methodology suggested 
here, as a more difficult and unusual comparative method, is even more rarely considered 
within international law.
108
  While sometimes noted,
109
 it is rarely considered in depth, 




But, the blame for the lack of comparative and comparative legal cultural analyses of 
international law, to the extent blame is relevant, cannot just be laid at the feet of 
international law researchers.  Comparatists have also been reluctant to apply themselves 
to international issues.
111
  Indeed, traditional comparative analyses are often attacked “for 
isolationism vis-á-vis related legal subjects (such as jurisprudence or international law) 
and for lack of interdisciplinary efforts” and “for persistent Eurocentrism and obsession 
with private law; as well as for lack of attention to international regimes”.
112
 Though 
there are some efforts, especially within the last few years, when comparatists have 
tackled international law issues, most often those works relate to those times when 
international and national have concurrent jurisdiction.
113
  But, it is clear that there is a 
need for more comparatists to consider international law fields and institutions, and 
within their comparative analyses to apply some of the less traditional methodologies, 
such as comparative legal cultural analyses.
114
   Though, it should be noted that even 
within comparative law’s consideration of domestic systems, legal cultures are not 
always formally acknowledged.  After all, legal cultural analyses has often been carried 
                                                 
107 See Section III above. 
108 David Kennedy, ‘New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance’, (1997)  
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legal cultural analyses). 
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114 As Demleitner notes, “national and international legal systems, driven by economic globalization, migration  and the 
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746-47. 
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out “sub silentio”, without explicit methodological exposition.
115
 Though this may have
been more the case in the previous generation of comparatists.  Vivian Curran argues that 
the “elder statesmen” of American comparative law, as émigrés from Europe, “[b]eing of 
two countries, and sometimes more, the comparatist scholars of the last generation 
understood that translating from one legal discourse to another requires an understanding 
of the respective legal cultures.”
116
  Today’s generation less typically has that innate
understanding.  Though, in some ways we cannot fault comparative (and international 
law scholars) for their failure to use legal cultural analyses, for legal academics in general 
have themselves been “relative latecomers to cultural analysis and cultural studies” .
117
Despite the general failure to consider legal culture within the legal academy, 
comparatists should know better, for they are confronted with it more often and starkly 
than is likely the case for legal academics focused within domestic legal systems.  Indeed, 
Nora Demleitner has noted that while “the original purpose of comparative law was to 
facilitate European cross-border trade through a comparison of legal rules, today it can 
assist in mediating conflicts that may arise from the cross border movement of persons 
who are imbued with the values of the legal culture into which they were born [and] can 
reveal how another person perceives the world, and how law contributes to and reflects 
the culture of a country.”
118
 Clearly, comparative law can go further and extend into
helping international legal regimes handle their interactions with domestic systems and 
peoples with different legal cultures.  Demleitner further suggests the employment for 
human rights research of a methodology such as that proposed in this article, and says 
that if it were to be done then “comparative law could finally also live up to its promise 
and goal of becoming “a worldwide legal discipline” .
119
Having established that the methodology could and should be applied to research on 
international economic law, it remains to show how it could actually be implemented in 
practice.  At a concrete level, that implementation or application of the methodology will 
be carried out by the three different groups of legal participants within international 
economic law—IEL scholars, practitioners, and officials.  While there will be some 
overlap, generally speaking each of those groups will apply the methodology in different 
ways and in different contexts.  As an initial matter, scholars are more likely to explicitly 
resort to the methodology, generally having the time and incentive to consider and 
present their methodological approaches.  Not typically having pressing client or 
115 Curran (fn 35) 52. 
116 ibid 53. 
117 See Sarat & Simon (fn 55) 13 (quoting Robert Post: “We have long been accustomed to think of law as something 
apart. The grand ideals of justice, of impartiality and fairness, have seemed to remove law from the ordinary disordered 
paths of life.  For this reason efforts to unearth connections between law and culture have appeared vaguely tinged with 
expose, as though the idol were revealed to have merely human feet.  In recent years, with a firmer sense of the 
encompassing inevitability of cultue, the scandal has diminished, and the enterprise of actually tracing the uneasy 
relationship of law to culture has begin in earnest.” From Robert Post (ed.), Law and the Order of Culture, at vii 
(University of California Press, Berkeley 1991)). 
118 Demleitner (fn 111)  745 (footnotes omitted). 
119 ibid 758 (citing Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: 
Towards a New Model for Comparative Law’, (1998) 47 ICLQ 495-536, 511). 
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institutional demands on their research, scholars will more often than the other groups 
have the luxury of considering and apply different methodological approaches to the 
issues they are examining.  Furthermore, due to the nature of the final product they 
produce, explicit presentation of their methodological approach is more likely than that in 
litigation or international organization legal documents.   Furthermore, that application, 
divorced as it is from concrete or live disputes, can delve more deeply and into the more 
esoteric aspects of the legal cultural disconnects that may exist across and within the 
field.  For example, the author is in the process of undertaking a scholarly analysis of the 
attitudes to the field of IEL scholars in communities with strong present and historic 
connections to Confucianism, such as those of China, Vietnam, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Korea, and Taiwan.  That project involves a carefully constructed and implemented 
survey of IEL scholars in those “Confucian” communities, attempting to tease out any 
different approaches to IEL that may be related to overt or subconscious legal cultural 
attitudes that may be related to Confucianism.
120
  For example, identification of a greater 
role for “virtue” in approaches and expected goals of IEL fields and institutions among 
those scholars might lend support to the idea that Confucianism is playing a role in their 
legal culture and in their understandings of and work within IEL.  Of course, such studies 
are difficult and complex, and may often lead to inconclusive results.  But, to the extent 
insights and useable results do emerge, they will be very important in the understanding 
and development of the field, particularly if for that project the study is extended to IEL 
officials from those societies. 
 
While scholars have the luxury of being able to engage in detailed contemplations of the 
field, practitioners are forced to respond to the legal cultural issues that arise in the 
context of servicing clients in such areas as transnational disputes and transactions.   
Whenever there are dispute settlement proceedings and transactions involving 
participants from different legal cultures there is no question that identifying and 
understanding the legal cultural pressure points will be of great value.  For example, in 
the international investment arbitration context, Jan Paulson recently discussed this very 
issue, noting the fact that “skilled advocates need to be attuned to the culture of the 
arbitrators they face is self-evident; it is an obvious and essential element of the 
internationally active advocate’s credibility and persuasiveness.”
121
 Paulson also noted 
the critical need to understand the legal culture of the advocates on the other side of a 
dispute, both with respect to their legal cultural behaviours within the arbitral hearings, 
but also outside those hearings.
122
  In significant part, practitioners learn, often through 
trial and error, how to navigate these legal cultural minefields through successive 
interactions with arbitrators and advocates from different legal cultural backgrounds.  By 
knowing to look for legal cultural influences within the procedural and substantive law of 
the different fields and institutions within IEL, practitioners gain an advantage over those 
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that do not include such analysis in their work.  For example, such advantage can be 
gained through the appropriate presentation of legal sources and authorities, such as the 
correct weight to be given to principles and treatises before arbitrators from a civilian 
legal culture.
123
  Similarly, understanding that counsel from common law jurisdictions 
may have an irrational attachment to their forms of civil procedure can be helpful when 
negotiating a compromis.
124
 While not usually dispositive, the small gains may be 
sufficient to tilt the balance in favour of the party employing the legal cultural analysis, 
just as those skilled in private international law have an advantage over opposition less 
skilled in choice of law analysis. 
 
Governmental and international organization officials will also find legal cultural 
analyses helpful, both within proceedings, similarly to practitioners, and also as they seek 
to develop the law, similarly to scholars.  Additionally, due to the cosmopolitan nature of 
international organizations, both international organization officials and the member 
states delegation officials of those organizations must navigate a complex mix of legal 
cultures—within the organization among the different individuals that work there as well 
as within the resultant substantive and procedural law of the organization.  Thus, an 
American government official working at the WTO in Geneva, will often work with 
officials from the other delegations as well as with the WTO’s officials, who are 
themselves very likely to reflect the legal cultures of their home jurisdictions.
125
 
Furthermore, all those officials must learn to work with a substantive and procedural law 
that is likely to reflect the numerous legal cultural heritages of those involved in the 
creation and development of the organization.  Of course, like practitioners, through 
experience official should be able to learn to look out for the legal cultural conflicts that 
must inevitably arise within such organizations. But, there is a risk that the legal cultural 
issues will be subconsciously ignored, under the misapprehension that legal culture is an 
issue for domestic law alone, and not present within the international legal order.
126
  
Greater explicit consideration of legal culture and comparative legal cultural analyses 
will help to counter that fallacy.  Finally, for international organizations there are also 
important internal institutional applications of the methodology that are less present for 
scholars and practitioners.
127
  Employment of legal cultural analysis will help to reveal 
legal cultural influences within the international organization, influences that may not 
always be in the best or long term interest of the organization or field.  For example, a 
strong common law legal cultural influence may undermine the acceptability of the 
organization and its law with non-common law systems, the majority in the world, and 
may impede implementation within those non-common law systems.
128
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Even after each of the above different IEL participants commits to employing legal 
cultural analyses, they are then faced with the difficulties associated with the application 
of this methodology that spans the two typically separate fields of international and 
comparative law.  Furthermore, because comparative legal cultural analyses focus on 
behaviour and sociological indicators, IEL legal actor participants will need to learn to 
think differently.  While still important, the traditional doctrinal approaches to sources of 
law, processes and institutions may need to be supplemented with the more nuanced and 
often behaviourist approach that will often be associated with comparative legal cultural 
analyses.  In addition, because different legal cultures will be at issue, comparative law 
considerations may be more central.  Those comparative considerations might include 
traditional comparative methodological approaches to employment of the substantive 
content of comparative law—its attention to the legal classifications and the differing 
legal approaches within the many different major and sometimes minor traditions and 
systems.  It may be that trained and expert comparatists will need to be involved, both for 
their knowledge and their approaches.  If nothing else, it should become clear to IEL 
legal participants that excessive specialization that does not include comparative law may 
not be the best approach for operating in an increasingly interconnected field. 
VII. CONLUSION
While the proposal in this article is not nearly so grand or momentous, an apt analogy 
that helps to convey the contribution of the article to the field would be when the 
telescope which had only been used to see distant objects at sea or on land was improved 
by Galileo, permitting him to turn it on the night sky for the first time.  That new use 
revealed that the Milky Way was composed of stars, that the surface of the moon had 
craters and mountains, and that Jupiter had moons.
129
  While that early telescope did not
provide many answers, it raised new and important questions and provided insights into 
our understandings of the Earth, the night sky and the universe.  Similarly, while many 
answers are not provided by this article, novel insights are illuminated that will lead to 
new questions and lines of inquiry, and eventually, through later similar studies, will lead 
to greater understandings of the international legal order. 
129 Encyclopedia Britanica (15th edition), vol. 7 (1990), at 640. 
